Tolling For the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed’: The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability Law by Perlin, Michael L. & Cucolo, Heather Ellis
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
2017
Tolling For the Aching Ones Whose Wounds
Cannot Be Nursed’: The Marginalization of Racial
Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental
Disability Law
Michael L. Perlin
New York Law School, michael.perlin@nyls.edu
Heather Ellis Cucolo
New York Law School, heather.cucolo@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Disability Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Psychology Commons,
and the Law and Race Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice, Vol. 20, Issue 3 (Summer 2017), pp. 431-458
"Tolling For the Aching Ones Whose Wounds
Cannot Be Nursed": The Marginalization of
Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional
Mental Disability Law Policing Rape
Complaints
Michael L. Perlin* and Heather Ellis Cucolo
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 431
II. RACE, GENDER, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT ........................... 435
III. A CONSIDERATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES... ............... 446
IV. FOUR FACTORS..................................................451
A. Sanism............................................451
B. Pretextuality........................................452
C. Heuristics..........................................452
D. False "Ordinary Common Sense" ............. ............ 453
E. The Keys to Future Progress.............................453
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE.....................................454
VI. CONCLUSION.................................................... 457
1. INTRODUCTION
Individuals with mental disabilities have traditionally been, and continue to
be, subjected to rights violations and pervasive discrimination because of their
mental disabilities, both domestically and internationally.' Seen as "the other,"
individuals who are racial minorities, women, or both are marginalized to an
even greater extent than other persons with mental disabilities in matters related
to civil commitment and institutional treatment (especially involving the right to
* Professor Emeritus of Law; Founding Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform
Project, New York Law School; and Co-Founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates.
" Pool attorney, Office of the New Jersey Public Defender; Adjunct Professor, New York Law
School; and Co-Founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates.
i See generally, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333 (2007) (examining
mental disability laws and their interaction with international law).
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refuse medication). 2 This extra marginalization also extends to questions of
discharge planning, community mental health care, and forensic mental health.3
Expert testimony-testimony that is essential and necessary in all these
cases-is often infected with bias that leads to skewed legal decision making. It
is impossible to examine these questions critically without coming to grips with
this reality.' Beginning with a consideration of disparities in the access and
quality of mental health care among those women and racial and ethnic
minorities with mental disabilities,5 we need to focus on why the struggle to
overcome rights violations is often greater for persons who are not of the
dominant race or gender, and why it is essential that this area of law must be
studied in the context of prevailing social policies as they relate to these topics.
There is no question that the struggle to overcome rights violations is often
greater for persons with mental disabilities who are not of the dominant race or
gender, and it is necessary to study this area of law in the context of prevailing
social policies as they relate to these issues. Here we cannot avoid consideration
of the significance of the interrelationships between social biases and
"scientific" judgment, as reflected in expert testimony in cases related to all the
sub-areas of mental disability law referred to above.' In this paper, we thus
consider how race and gender relate to decisions made about the civil
commitment process and the implications of these findings in multiple contexts
including, but not limited to, state-sanctioned racial segregation, misdiagnosis
and over-diagnosis, the pernicious use of racial and gender stereotypes, the
deeper significance of disparities in access to health services, and cultural
competency.' We also consider how race and gender relate to decisions made
about institutional rights and the implications of these findings, considering
issues related to restraint and seclusion, administration of antipsychotic
2 See generally, e.g., Carolyn S. Salisbury, From Violence and Victimization to Voice and
Validation: Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Children's Law Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 623 (2005) (discussing the structural system's further abuse of victims); Michael L. Perlin &
Deborah A. Dorfman, "The Sources of This Hidden Pain": Why a Class in Race, Gender, Class and
Mental Disability?, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS & TRANSFORMATIVE LAW TEACHING: A
CRITICAL READER 313 (2011).
This paper will be limited almost exclusively to matters of civil psychiatric institutionalization. The
authors are currently researching the same issues in forensic contexts.
4 See, e.g., Megan A. Yamall, Dueling Scientific Experts: Is Australia's Hot Tub Method a Viable
Solution for the American Judiciary?, 88 OR. L. REV. 311, 320 (2009) ("Selection bias, conscious
and unconscious bias, and professional self-interest pose significant threats to obtaining justice in
cases requiring expert testimony.").
s See generally, e.g., Vemellia R. Randall, Racial Discrimination in Health Care in the United States
as a Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (2002) (discussing racial disparities in the U.S.
healthcare system).
6 See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 625, 641 (1993) (quoting Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon in
The Best Interests of the Child, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1096, 1107 (1988)).
See infra text accompanying notes 22-101.
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medication, dual diagnosis (along with substance abuse), and the extent to which
information about side-effects of medication is shared with patients. Our
findings are not a surprise: our most vulnerable populations-racial, cultural,
and gender minorities-are consistently harmed by marginalization that targets
persons with mental disabilities.
In an attempt to understand how the current state of affairs developed, we
then consider the four key factors that permeate and poison all of mental
disability law: sanism, pretextuality, heuristic reasoning, and (false) "ordinary
common sense" (OCS).8 One of the co-authors, Michael L. Perlin, wrote some
eighteen years ago that "it is impossible to truly understand the jurisprudence in
any of these areas without first understanding sanism and pretextuality."9 In
another article-this about the relationship between mental disability law and
international human rights law-Perlin referred to the "[p]ervasive corruption of
sanism that permeates all of mental disability law, and . . . reflects a blinding
pretextuality that contaminates legal practice in this area."iO We believe that
these factors-along with heuristics and OCS-that "distort our abilities to
consider information rationally"' '-equally contaminate practice in these areas.
We will contextualize all of this within the model of therapeutic jurisprudence-
a vehicle through which we can assess the impact of case law and legislation on
the subjects of such law.' 2 Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes "the law as a
therapeutic agent" and that it can have "therapeutic or anti-therapeutic"
8 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW [hereinafter PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY] (discussing how
these factors control the relationship between mental disability and the entire criminal justice
system).
I Michael L. Perlin, "Half- Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and
How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4 (1999)
[hereinafter Perlin, Half- Wracked Prejudice].
o Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional
Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 487 (2009).
" Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate
the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 343, 365 n.127
(2013) (citing PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 8, at 31).
2 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun ": The International
Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 301 (2013) (discussing the incarceration of juvenile offenders with disability
through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence, specifically with regard to international human rights
law); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental
Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REv. 257 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin &
Lynch, Sexless Patients] (exploring the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence when discussing
the competency of an individual with mental disabilities to engage in sexual activity); Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology, Scientific Discoveries
and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland]
(discussing how therapeutic jurisprudence lends perspective on the use of brain imaging as evidence
in a criminal trial).
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consequences." "The ultimate aim of [therapeutic jurisprudence] is to determine
whether legal rules, procedures, and the role of lawyers can or should be
reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due
process principles."1 4 The law can and should use therapeutic jurisprudence as a
mechanism "to expose pretextuality and strip bare the law's sanist fagade," and
thus "become a powerful tool that will serve as a means of attacking and
uprooting the 'we/they distinction' that has traditionally plagued and
stigmatized" persons with mental disability. " This must be kept in mind
throughout the consideration of these issues, especially in the context of the
"we/they distinction." We will conclude by offering some modest suggestions as
to how the current situation might best be remediated, using therapeutic
jurisprudence as the basis of our proposed solutions.
Our title comes, in part, from the final verse of Bob Dylan's masterpiece,
Chimes of Freedom:'6
Starry-eyed an' laughing as I recall when we were caught
Trapped by no track of hours for they hanged suspended
As we listened one last time an' we watched with one last look
Spellbound an' swallowed 'til the tolling ended
Tolling for the aching ones whose wounds cannot be nursed
For the countless confused, accused, misused, strung-out ones
an' worse
13 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885,
912 (2009).
" See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "Far from the Turbulent Space ": Considering
the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent
Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 125, 165 (2015).
1 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 19 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 165, 174 (2003) (internal
quotations omitted).
16 BOB DYLAN, Chimes of Freedom, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1964)
(lyrics available at http://bobdylan.com/songs/chimes-freedom/).
One of the authors (MLP) has turned to this song multiple times before-in solo articles and in
articles with other co-authors-as the inspiration for titles of other scholarly articles about
institutional mental disability law. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Chimes of Freedom:" International
Human Rights and Institutional Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423
(2002); Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN
ST. L. REv. 1159 (2013); Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the
ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV.
193 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw]; Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild
Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor TenBroek, and the
Rights of'Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 413 (2008); Astrid Birgden &
Michael L. Perlin, "Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked": Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by
Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231 (2008); Michael L. Perlin &
Alison Lynch, "Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair": Risk, Security, Danger, the
Constitution, and the Clinician's Dilemma, - IND. J. L. & SOC. EQUALITY -(2016) (forthcoming).
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An' for every hung-up person in the whole wide universe
An' we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing1 7
Per the critic, Robert Sheldon, "Chimes is Dylan's 'most political song' and
an expression of 'affinity' for a 'legion of the abused.'"' Dylanologist Oliver
Trager concludes that, in Chimes, "Dylan dangles the notion that humanity has
yet to grasp the promises of liberty floating just out of reach." 19 We have chosen
this lyric for this article because the individuals about whom we write-and
whom we have each represented as practicing lawyers20 -are "aching" from the
discrimination they have faced. And, unfortunately, some have been so badly
wounded that their "wounds cannot be nursed." 21
II. RACE, GENDER, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT
The confluence of mental disability, gender, race, culture, and class often
result in unique legal issues that have a far-reaching impact on virtually every
aspect of the lives of those with mental disabilities. We do not believe that it is
possible to understand any aspect of mental disability law (civil or criminal,
constitutional or statutory, private or public) without understanding the
intersection of race, gender, class, and culture with mental illness. To answer the
questions before us, we must also consider carefully why the struggle to
overcome rights violations is often greater for persons with mental disabilities
" See DYLAN, supra note 16.
18 ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 157-58 (1997);
see also, as quoted in Michael L. Perlin, Tangled Up in Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38
FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1395, 1418 (2011) (quoting ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE
LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 157-58 (1997)).
9 OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 105 (2004).
20 Before MLP became a law professor, he spent thirteen years as a lawyer representing persons with
mental disabilities, including three years in which his focus was primarily on such individuals
charged with a crime. In this role, during his time as a Deputy Public Defender in Mercer County
(Trenton) NJ, he represented several hundred individuals at the "maximum security hospital for the
criminally insane" in New Jersey habeas corpus hearings and was the forerunner to civil
commitment hearings, both in individual cases and in the following class action: Dixon v. Cahill,
No. L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reprinted in 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN &
HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 19-8 (3d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter PERLIN & CUCOLO]; see generally Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 16, at 207
n.94 (discussing Dixon v. Cahill, No. L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973)).
For the next eight years, he was the director of the N.J. Division of Mental Health Advocacy. In this
role, he supervised the representation of tens of thousands of individuals facing civil commitment at
psychiatric facilities in New Jersey. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a
Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169 (1982) (advocating for legal advocacy at commitment
hearings); Michael L. Perlin, "Infinity Goes up on Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the
Representation ofDefendants with Mental Disabilities, 16 QUT L. REV. 106, 106-07 (2016).
HEC practiced sex offender civil commitment law full-time for seven years and continues to take
cases on a referral basis. Currently, she is an adjunct professor at New York Law School and teaches
a variety of courses in criminal and mental disability law including, Race, Gender, Class, Culture
and Mental Disability Law.
21 See DYLAN, supra note 16.
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who are not of the dominant race, gender, class, or culture and why it is essential
that this area of law must be contextualized in the prevailing social policies that
relate to race, gender, class, and culture.
The outline of the law that governs involuntary civil commitment is
relatively straightforward. To be eligible for such commitment a person must be
mentally ill, and as a result of that mental illness be dangerous to self or others. 22
The burden of proof is on the prosecuting authority by a standard of clear and
convincing evidence.23 Virtually every aspect of the civil commitment process-
questions dealing with the meaning of "dangerousness," the application of the
"least restrictive doctrine," the meaning of "grave disability" in the commitment
context, the role of counsel, the right to periodic review of a civil commitment,
the relationship between civil commitment and the forensic process-has been
considered extensively in the literature in the past 40 years. 24 But, there has been
shockingly little attention paid to the questions we are addressing here.
We begin with a sobering reality. Virtually all state psychiatric facilities in
the South were segregated until the mid-1960s,25 a full decade after the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.26 Conditions in hospitals were
particularly abysmal for black patients, 27 and the continuation of these abysmal
conditions was supported by expert testimony. 28 Mental health professionals
opposed desegregation, testifying that "integration is not in the best interest of
22 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975); see PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, § 3-
5.1.2, at 3-102 to 3-112.
23 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979); see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, §
4-2.3.2, at 4-93 to 4-98.
24 See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, Chapters 3, 4, 13, 14 (providing detailed
summaries of case law concerning the civil commitment process and mental disabilities in the law).
25 For an historic consideration, see LYNN GAMWELL & NANCY TOMES, MADNESS IN AMERICA:
CULTURAL AND MEDICAL PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS BEFORE 1914 56 (1995).
26 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 See, e.g., Marable v. Ala. Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291, 294 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 1969) ("the
Negro patients at Treatment Center Number Two do not have the benefit of special psychiatric
projects available to the white patients at the main complex such as the project of intensive treatment
for young male schizophrenics financed by the Public Health Service"); id. at 294 ("the medical
services and facilities for care and rehabilitation of Negro patients are not only separate from but are
typically inferior to those available to white patients"). On the history of racial inequality in health
care in the United States, see, e.g., Vemellia R. Randall, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in
Health Care: A Call for State Health Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
1, 8-16 (2006) (describing the history of racial inequality in healthcare laws). See generally David
B. Smith, The Racial Segregation of Hospital Care Revisited: Medicare Discharge Patterns and
Their Implications, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 461 (1998) (researching the long-term effects of
desegregated health care services).
28 But see W.E.B. DUBoIS, DUSK OF DAWN 309 (1940) ("Segregated hospitals are better than those
where the Negro patients are neglected or relegated to the cellar."). As one scholar has noted,
"DuBois' practical approach here does not minimize the crime of segregation, much as the work of
the Red Cross in World War II did not legitimize Nazi atrocities." Kevin Outterson, Tragedy and
Remedy: Reparations fbr Disparities in Black Health, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 735, 769 n.181
(2005).
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the patients,"29 and that "psychiatric care can best be delivered in a segregated
setting." 30
There are strong vestiges of this sorry history today. We know, by way of
example, that African-Americans are frequently misdiagnosed with psychotic
disorders, especially schizophrenia; African-Americans in inpatient units are
almost twice as likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia as are whites. 31
Professor Susan Stefan stated bluntly, "[i]n the public mental health system,
being Black is associated with diagnoses of schizophrenia and with lower
socioeconomic status." 32 Further, African-Americans are more likely to be
overdiagnosed as having a psychotic disorder.33 Research has shown that within
the population of people admitted to state psychiatric hospitals, African-
Americans are almost five times more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia
as compared with Euro-Americans. 34
It is vital to stress that this differential is not due to actual epidemiological
differences; there is no difference between the rate of schizophrenia and
psychotic disorders among African-Americans and white Americans when
controlled for socio-economic class. 35 Within the vast array of race and
diagnostic trend-related studies, it appears that a clinician's own race does not
alter this diagnostic trend, although "very few literature reviews have complied
29 Susan Stefan, Issues Relating to Women and Ethnic Minorities in Mental Health Treatment and Law,
in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 240,246-47 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Stefan, Women and Ethnic Minorities].
30 Charles Prudhomme & David F. Musto, Historical Perspectives on Mental Health and Racism in
the United States, in RACISM AND MENTAL HEALTH: ESSAYS 25 (Charles Vert Willie, Bernard M.
Kramer & Bertram S. Brown eds., 1973). See also Tony B. Lowe, Nineteenth Century Review of
Mental Health Care br African Americans: A Legacy ofService and Policy Barriers, 33 J. Soc. &
Soc. WELFARE 29, 39 (2006). For the largely-unknown "back story," see David Barton Smith,
Healthcare's Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 37 (2003). These attitudes persist
today. See, e.g., Kellee White, Jennifer S. Haas, & David R. Williams, Elucidating the Role ofPlace
in Health Care Disparities: The Example of Racial/Ethnic Residential Segregation, 47 HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 1278 (2012).
3 Lonnie R. Snowden & Freda K. Cheung, Use of Inpatient Mental Health Services by Members of
Ethnic Minority Groups, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 347, 349 (1990). By way of example, 79% of
blacks in a public sector hospital were diagnosed with schizophrenia, versus 43% of whites. Stephen
M. Strakowski, Richard C. Shelton & Meredith L. Kolbrener, The Effects ofRace and Comorbidity
on Clinical Diagnosis in Patients with Psychosis, 54 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 96, 97 (1993); see
generally Stephen M. Strakowski et al., The Effects of Race on Diagnosis and Disposition from a
Psychiatric Emergency Service, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 101 (1995).
32 Susan Stefan, Race, Competence Testing, and Disability Law: A Review of the MacArthur
Competence Research, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 31, 42 (1996).
* See generally Michelle DeCoux Hampton, The Role of Treatment Setting and High Acuity in the
Overdiagnosis of Schizophrenia in African Americans, 21 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 327
(2007).
34 Arnold Barnes, Race, Schizophrenia, and Admission to State Psychiatric Hospitals, 31 ADMIN. &
POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 241, 250 (2004).
3 LEE N. ROBINS & DARREL A. REGIER, PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN AMERICA: THE
EPIDEMIOLOGIC CATCHMENT AREA SURVEY 47 (1991).
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information for future research or practice purposes." 36 Thus, one answer in
combating this overdiagnosis trend is to value "diversity, objectivity, and the
ethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence" by incorporating cultural
sensitivity into the provision of services for mental health care.3 7
Furthering the application of cultural sensitivity becomes even more
important with the multifaceted factors of class and economic status. These
findings cannot be meaningfully extricated from findings that deal with class.
By way of example, research shows that the over-diagnosis of schizophrenia
among blacks virtually disappears in very high poverty areas, where blacks and
whites are diagnosed with schizophrenia at almost the same rate. 1 The
differential is at its greatest in areas where people are relatively better off: in
lower poverty areas, 39% of black public mental health service users are
diagnosed with schizophrenia versus 29% of white public mental health service
users." Studies have also shown Asians and Asian-Americans to be greatly
overrepresented in diagnoses of schizophrenia, regardless of poverty level.40
The issues here are confounded by parallel issues involving access to health
care services. Black individuals have significantly less access to mental health
services than do white individuals. One study looked at the provision of mental
health services to children in the school system and found that white youth were
twice as likely to access such school provided services, as were black youth with
the same diagnoses.4 1 Barriers to access of services were commonly reported by
both ethnic groups and an unfortunate trend towards the greater the need, the
more numerous the barriers, was cited.42 In a similar study, researchers found
the same ratio in adult populations. 43
Beyond the question of access to health care services, it is also vital to
assess the quality of treatment provided to these populations. An overdiagnosis
of schizophrenia is especially detrimental because it increases the potential for
36 Robert C. Schwartz & David M Blankenship, Racial Disparities in Psychotic Disorder Diagnosis:
A Review ofEmpirical Literature, 4 WORLD J. PSYCHIATRY 133, 135 (2014).
" Id. See also Richard H. Dana, Mental Health Services for African Americans: A Cultural/Racial
Perspective, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 3 (2002) (discussing how
cultural information can inform service delivery and improve services to African Americans).
31 See generally Stephen M. Strakowski et al., Racial Differences in the Diagnosis of Psychosis, 21
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 117 (1996).
39 Julian Chun-Chung Chow, Kim Jaffee & Lonnie Snowden, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in the Use of
Mental Health Services in Poverty Areas, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 792, 794 (2003).
40 Id.
41 Adrian Angold et al., Psychiatric Disorder, Impairment, and Service Use in Rural African
American and White Youth, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 893, 897 (2002).
42 Id. at 899.
43 Kenneth Wells et al., Ethnic Disparities in Unmet Need for Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Care, 158 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 2027, 2030 (2001).
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treatment with the wrong medications." Studies have reported that African-
Americans were less likely than whites to receive guideline-adherent treatment
when suffering from anxiety disorders and depression.4 5 Additionally, African-
Americans were relatively unlikely to receive guideline-based care. 46 We also
now know that physicians are more verbally dominant and engage in less
patient-centered communication with African-American patients than with white
patients. 47 Incorrect treatment and misdiagnosis has a substantial effect on a
person's ability to function well within a community.
In the community context, behavior by African-Americans is more often
interpreted as "dangerous" than identical behavior by whites 48 and African-
Americans are more often diagnosed with a conduct disorder49 than whites.5 0
The diagnosis of a conduct disorder can signify to civil commitment fact-finders
that the individual has a greater propensity for dangerousness.5 1
This concept of dangerousness is furthered distorted through how
individuals come into contact with the mental health system. We can analyze
this within the context of emergency room (ER) usage and at what point police
" Arnold Barnes, Race and Hospital Diagnoses of Schizophrenia and Mood Disorders, 53 Soc.
WORK 77, 80-82 (2008).
4s Alexander S. Young et al., The Quality of Care for Depressive and Anxiety Disorders in the
United States, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 55 (2001).
46 Philip S. Wang et al., Recent Care of Common Mental Disorders in the United States, 15 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 284, 290 (2001).
4 Rachel L. Johnson et al., Patient Race/Ethnicity and Quality of Patient-Physician Communication
During Medical Visits, 94 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 2084, 2084 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 483, 499-501 (2004); James Hicks, Ethnicity,
Race, and Forensic Psychiatry: Are We Color-Blind?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 21, 23
(2004).
In a very different context, the United States Supreme Court has just reversed a death penalty
sentence in a case in which a defendant's own trial lawyer called an expert witness who testified the
man was more apt to be dangerous in the future because he is black. See Buck v. Davis, 137 U.S.
759 (2017).
4 A conduct disorder is a common childhood psychiatric problem that increases in incidence in
adolescence. The primary diagnostic features of conduct disorder include aggression, theft,
vandalism, violations of rules, and/or lying. H. Russel Searight et al., Conduct Disorder: Diagnosis
and Treatment in Primary Care, 63 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1579 (2001).
o Melissa P. Delbello et al., Effects ofRace on Psychiatric Diagnosis ofHospitalized Adolescents: A
Retrospective Chart Review, 11 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 95 (2001).
si See, e.g., Maribel Morey, The Civil Commitment of State-Dependent Minors: Resonating
Discourses that Leave Her Heterosexuality and His Homosexuality Vulnerable to Scrutiny, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2129, 2136 (2006). By comparison, a recent study of institutionalized juveniles
revealed that 32% of committed males had a disruptive diagnosis (e.g., conduct disorder or attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder). See David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the
MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency
Systems, 32 AM. JL. & MED. 503, 509 (2006).
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intervention becomes necessary. 52 Firstly, individuals who seek psychiatric
treatment in the ER are more likely to be involuntarily committed, and we know
that-for a variety of issues, mostly having to do with poverty access to health
care and lack of medical insurance" -African-Americans are at least twice as
likely to go to the ER than whites.54 Secondly, because episodes of psychiatric
crisis violate norms of acceptable behavior, it is often members of the
community who decide whether to contact mental health authorities or police,
thereby initiating emergency room visits.5 5 African-Americans are more likely
to be brought to the ER by police than whites and those who are brought to the
ER by police are even more likely to be involuntarily committed. 16
Consider these findings in the context of other findings that relate to one of
the statutory predicates for civil commitment-a finding of dangerousness 57 -
and one of the "real life" predicates for civil commitment-an increase in
mental health symptoms due to non-compliance with medication.5 8 Although
one study found insignificant ethnic disparities in the use versus non-use of
antipsychotics, 59 it observed that African-American patients and other ethnic
minorities were consistently less likely than non-ethnic minorities to be treated
with newer antipsychotics.6 0 Consider then, the further likelihood that African-
American patients would abandon prescribed medications-especially in the
community-given the severity of the side effects of older generation
52 See generally Harriet L. Wolfe & Chris Hatcher, The Role of Violence in Decisions About
Hospitalization Iom the Psychiatric Emergency Room, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207 (1992) (noting
that clinical variables such as diagnosis and overall severity of psychiatric impairment were more
important than violent behavior in predicting hospitalization decisions). Evidence reveals that
African-Americans typically receive poorer emergency room treatment than whites. See, e.g., David
R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in Health, 24 HEALTH
AFF. 325 (2005).
5 See, e.g., SUSAN STEFAN, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT TREATMENT OF THE PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT:
POLICY ISSUES AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 20-22 (2006).
54 Id. at 25 (citing Linda McCaig & Catharine W. Burt, National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care
Survey, 2002 Emergency Department Summary (2004), n.72).
* See generally Lonnie R. Snowden, Barriers to Effective Mental Health Services for Afican
Americans, 3 MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 181 (2001).
s6 See STEFAN, supra note at 53 (citing Lawrence W. Reinish & J. Richard Ciccone, Involuntary
Hospitalization and Police Referrals to a Psychiatric Emergency Department, 23 AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 289 (1995), n. 114.
* See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
* See generally Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law:
Kendra's Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL., PUB. POLY & L. 183 (2003). See, e.g., A.E. v. State, 83
So.3d 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
* Joseph H. Puyat et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Use of Antipsychotic Medication: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 48 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1861,
1869 (2013).
60 Id.
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antipsychotics.6 ' A recurrence of an increase in mental health civil commitments
might very well be fueled by both the mischaracterization of African-American
behavior as more dangerous and by the likelihood that this cohort of individuals
might be disproportionately noncompliant with antipsychotics, a noncompliance
that is due to the significant detrimental side effects in older generation drugs. 62
In summary, there are multiple reasons why African-Americans are more
likely to be committed to psychiatric hospitals than whites, although they are no
more likely to have psychotic disorders or schizophrenia than whites when
controlled for socio-economic class:
* Misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis of schizophrenia and
psychotic disorders,
* Misinterpreting non-dangerous behavior as dangerous,
* Later onset of treatment and quality of treatment, and
* The commitment process more likely to be triggered by
police or ER admission. 63
The question of why differences occur in rates of civil commitment and in
rates of incarceration associated with mental illness remains to be answered. 6
Race is now accepted as socially constructed, and contemporary discourse is
also beginning to consider the ways in which mental status is socially
constructed. 65 One hypothesis is that mentally ill individuals who are also
members of minority groups are more visible and thus deviant behavior is more
readily recognized. 66 This hypothesis, known as the "visibility hypothesis,"
indicates that mentally ill individuals are more likely to be challenged under
these circumstances and efforts of social control are aimed "more at minority
individuals, especially male African-Americans, who exhibit symptoms of
mental illness." 67
6" See United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 743 (E.D. La. 2005). See, e.g., Rachel A.
Scherer, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute: A Legal, Medical, and Policy
Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 361, 381-82 (2007).
62 In the context of elderly patients, there are clear associations between medication adherence and
race. See Rajesh Balkrishnan, Predictors of Medication Adherence in the Elderly, 20 CLINICAL
THERAPEUTICS 764 (1998) (drawing a conclusion from study of 35-year range of scholarly articles
concerning predictors of medication compliance in the elderly).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
* Lonnie R. Snowden, Bias in Mental Health Assessment and Intervention: Theory and Evidence, 93
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 239, 241 (2003).
65 Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 15
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 16 (2010).
16 Ann F. Garland et al., Minority Populations in the Child Welfare System: The Visibility Hypothesis
Reexamined, 68 AM J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 142, 143 (1998).
61 Snowden, supra note 64, at 241.
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Consider next the role of gender." Historically, women were more likely to
be committed to psychiatric institutions for reasons having nothing to do with
statutory criteria and startlingly, for many years, consent to sterilization was
necessary for release of female patients. 69 Commitment to psychiatric
institutions beyond the legal statutory criteria included being pregnant out of
wedlock, disobeying their husbands, being politically active, and for making
accusations of rape.70 Two anecdotal examples from the practice career of one of
the co-authors (MLP) are illustrative:
* The "back stories" of the only contested commitments
prior to the creation of the Division of Mental Health
Advocacy.'
* The "three Ms" 72 ward discovered during pretrial
discovery in the Matter of S.L. case in New Jersey.
68 See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, Chapter 10 (discussing the rights of individuals
with mental disabilities in various community settings).
" This practice continued through, at least, the 1960s. See, e.g., In re Cavitt, 159 N.W.2d 566, 567
(Neb. 1968) (finding constitutional a statute which allowed sterilization of female patients); Michelle
Oberman, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul Lombardo's
Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 357 (2010) (describing the tradition of
sterilization of committed female patients through the story of Buck v. Bell).
'o Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labelling, and Law, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 1271, 1312 (1994); Stefan, Women and Ethnic Minorities, supra note 29.
" When MLP became director of the N.J. Division of Mental Health Advocacy in 1974, he asked the
Mercer County (Trenton) Assignment Judge, "Who did these cases in the past?" The judge said, "No
one, Michael. You'll be the first one." Then he paused, and went on. "Well, actually, no. I can recall
two cases, but" here he laughed, mordantly, and continued - "they were basically the same fact
pattern. A doctor wanted to marry his receptionist but didn't want to be saddled with alimony, so he
got a friend to certify that his wife was 'crazy.' In each case, the wife had squirreled away some
money, so she was able to retain counsel. But, in the 16 years that I have been a judge here, those
were the only two." See also Fair Oaks Hosp. v. Pocrass, 628 A.2d 829, 831 (N.J. Law Div. 1993)
(describing a case where, after a husband sought consultation from his attorney about marital
problems, he took his wife to a psychiatrist who committed the woman against her will).
72 The "three Ms" refer to: (1) miscegenation (commitment followed parental disapproval of their
daughter dating someone of another race); (2) menstruation (heavy menstrual periods were seen as
indicative of mental illness); and (3) masturbation (female masturbation also seen as indicative of
mental illness). See C.B. Davenport, The Effects of Race Intermingling, 56 PROC. AM. PHtL. Soc'Y
364, 367 (1917) (arguing that miscegenation can lead to a diminution of "mental vigor"); Megan
Stuart Mills, Some Comments on Stereotypes of the Anglo-Indians, Part 1, 1 INT'L J. ANGLO-INDIAN
STUD. 31, 37 (1996) ("Racialist theory of course, contributed its concepts of 'miscegenation',
including mental and moral degeneracy as genetic results of hybridisation"); THOMAS LAQUEUR,
MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 222 (1990) (noting that nineteenth-
century feminists disputed the assertion that, "because of the supposed ovarian drain" during
menstruation, women's "mental and physical energy ... was . . . in short supply"); Thomas Szasz,
Psychiatry and the Control of Dangerousness: On the Apotropaic Function of the Term "Mental
Illness", 39 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 375, 378 (2003) (on how masturbation was seen traditionally as a
sign of mental illness); MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE
LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? 100-03 (2016); E.H. Hare, Masturbatory Insanity: The History
of an Idea, 108 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 2 (1962) (delving in to the history of the hypothesis that
masturbation amounts to a mental disorder).
442 [20:2017]
"Tolling For the Aching Ones"
In addition, women are more often victims of physical and sexual abuse.74
In the late 1990's, an international report by the World Health Organization
(WHO) indicated that "women are more likely than men to be adversely affected
by: specific mental disorders, the most common being depression; the effects of
domestic violence; the effects of sexual violence; [and] escalating rates of
substance use." 1 Additional and increased quality of treatment was
recommended because "the multiple roles that they fulfill in society render them
at greater risk of experiencing mental disorders than others in the community."76
There is ample evidence that women have been diagnosed as "mentally ill" for
violating gender stereotypes: by showing anger, aggression, promiscuity, or
being a lesbian. 77 Violent women, for example, are more likely to be evaluated
for psychiatric conditions, while African-American men are less likely to
receive psychiatric evaluation.7 1 In The Manufacture of Madness, Thomas Szasz
analogized the historic practice of the persecution of witches with the twentieth
century practice of psychiatry and the persecution of persons labeled mentally
ill.79
Gender stereotypes also infect determinations of dangerousness.
Stereotypes dictate that women are weaker, more passive, less dangerous, less
responsible for their crimes, and more amenable to treatment than men. 80
" See In re S.L., 462 A. 2d 1252, 1258-59 (N.J. 1983) (describing how a ward of female patients
had been "discovered" at Greystone Psychiatric Hospital in New Jersey, and had, according to ward
staff, been committed (decades previously) for one of the "3 Ms."). Applicants for release in the S.L.
case had been institutionalized for as long as 52 years prior to the court's decision. Id.
7 Shannon Catalano et al., Female Victims of Violence, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1-5 (Sept.
2009) (describing how women are disproportionately victims of violence-particularly intimate
partner violence, and sexual assault); See also Erica L. Weiss et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse as a
Risk Factor for Depression in Women: Psychosocial and Neurobiological Correlates, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 816, 816 (1999) (noting that sexual abuse is a risk factor for depression in women).
7 Michelle K. Gomel, A Focus on Women, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 2 (1997),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/67225/1/WHOMSA NAM_97.4.pdf [hereinafter WORLD
HEALTH ORG.]
" Id. at vi.
n7 See Deborah A. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 80, 90 n.55, (1994) (citing MABEL RUTH FERNALD ET AL., A STUDY OF WOMEN
DELINQUENTS IN NEW YORK STATE 525-26 (1986) and CLYDE B. VEDDER & DORA B.
SOMERVILLE, THE DELINQUENT GIRL 49-50, 153-54 (1970)) (discussing the purported relationship
between female crime and an inability to adjust to "feminine roles"). See also Gabriel Arkles, Gun
Control, Mental Illness, and Black Trans and Lesbian Survival, 42 Sw. L. REV. 855, 877 (2013).
7 Melissa Thompson, Gender, Race, and Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, NAT'L INST.
OF CORR. (Mar. 2, 2011, 1:29 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/mentalhealth/archive
/2011/03/02/gender-race-and-mental-illness-in-the-criminal-justice-system.aspx; Melissa Thompson,
Race, Gender, and the Social Construction ofMental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 53 SoC.
PERSP. 99, 105-106 (2010).
7 THOMAS S. SZAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS xxiii (1970).
s0 Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal
Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 188 (1994).
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Women who are subject to commitment are more often perceived as dangerous
to themselves than dangerous to others, so, paradoxically, in terms of
commitment, they benefit from perceptions that they are less dangerous to
others, at least in cases involving evaluations by female clinicians. 8 ' On the
other hand, virtually any display of self-injurious behavior is likely to be
perceived as a precursor of imminent suicidality.82
Diagnoses that are distinctly attributed to either men or women also have an
impact on care and treatment and potential confinement. Specific mental
illnesses that are perceived as gender-specific influence and reveal gender-based
stereotypes. "'Gender-specific mental illness' refers to mental health problems
that only affect women or men because of biological and neurological
differences between the sexes."" An example of such illness is post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Stereotypes of PTSD identify the illness as one that
primarily affects males who have experienced some form of combat within
military service.84 Although PTSD has, in fact, been recognized as a gender-
prevalent mental illness-one that is more commonly experienced by one
gender over another-the prevalence exists within the female population even
though it is perceived as a male-dominant illness. 85 Resulting effects from
domestic violence, sexual assault, and other forms of physical abuse are
manifested through symptoms of PTSD that include "insomnia, flashbacks,
phobias, panic attacks, anxiety, depression, dissociation, a numbed toughness,
amnesia, shame, guilt, self-loathing, self-mutilation, and social withdrawal."86
As a result of societal expectations and norms, women suffering from PTSD fall
under the radar," when in fact "chronic, hidden family/domestic violence is
actually more, not less, traumatic than sudden violence at the hands of a
stranger, or of an enemy during war."" In 2004, "researchers from the Veterans
8' See, e.g., Eric B. Elbogen et al., Gender and Perceptions of Dangerousness in Civil Psychiatric
Patients, 6 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 215 (2001).
82 See, e.g., Karen Guan, Kathryn R. Fox & Mitchell J. Prinstein, Nonsuicidal Self-Injury as a Time-
Invariant Predictor ofAdolescent Suicide Ideation and Attempts in a Diverse Community Sample, 80
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 842 (2012); David Brent, Nonsuicidal Self-Injury as a
Predictor of'Suicidal Behavior in Depressed Adolescents, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 452 (2011).
83 Leslie Prentice, "At Risk for Incarceration ": Women in Poverty, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
and Medicaid, 32 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 81, 89 (2010).
84 Id. at 90.
8s Id. at 89-90.
8 Phyllis Chesler, Confessions of an Expert Witness, 19 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 161, 163 (1998).
8 Bonita M. Veysey, Specific Needs of Women Diagnosed with Mental Illnesses in U.S. Jails, in
WOMEN'S MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 368, 371 (Bruce Lubotsky
Levin et al. eds., 1998) (noting that "22.3 percent of women in jail were diagnosed with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder").
8 Chesler, supra note 86; see Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost
Control": The Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing After the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 881, 917-18 (2015) (discussing the significance of the American Psychiatric
Association's expansion of the definition of PTSD in the most recent version of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)).
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Administration reported that women with PTSD have more medical conditions
and worse physical health than non-traumatized women, even those with
depression." 89
This leads to a related question: do women who alleged they had been
raped and sexually abused have a right to treatment specific to their conditions
as women whose psychiatric disabilities were caused by their rape and trauma?
In Caroline C. v. Johnson, a consent judgment committed state officials to
detailed provisions mandating "the development and implementation of
appropriate mental health treatment for class members" who made these
allegations.90 The hope is that through advancements in neuroscience, evidence
showing brain function disparities and abnormalities will be more readily
acknowledged within the legal and medical communities to better assess,
understand, and treat the pervasiveness of PTSD in women. 91
It is also important to weigh these issues in the context of culture. 92 Lawyers
have thus suggested that cultural information and cultural evidence should be
brought to the civil commitment hearing, and should be integrated into
psychiatrists' assessments to insure authentic client-centered approaches to
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. 93 In this context, consider the range of
culturally-relevant issues that may have an impact on the disposition of a civil
8 Not Getting Over It: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, HARV. WOMEN'S HEALTH WATCH 1, 5
(Mar. 2005).
9o Caroline C. v. Johnson, 174 F.R.D. 452 (D. Neb. 1996) (certifying class action); Caroline C. v.
Johnson, No. 4:CV95-22 (D. Neb. Oct. 29, 1998) (entering consent judgment); see also Winiviere
Sy, The Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity, 23
WHITTIER L. REV. 545, 546-47 (2001) (discussing policies regarding consensual sexual activities at
two California hospitals). See generally PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 72.
91 Chesler, supra note 86; see also, e.g., Vasiliki Michopoulos, Seth Davin Norrholm & Tanja
Jovanovic, Diagnostic Biomarkers for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Promising Horizons
from Translational Neuroscience Research, 78 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 344 (2015).
92 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, "Where Souls Are Forgotten ": Cultural
Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 257 (2009) (discussing the relevance of cultural competency to the forensic mental health
process); see also Sierra Villaran, Narratives of Cultural Collision and Racial Oppression: How to
Reconcile Theories of a Cultural Defense and Rotten Social Background Defense to Best Serve
Criminal Defendants, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1240-41 (2015) ("Courtrooms are sites for the
production of cultural meaning, as scenes from the justice system play out and actors both within
and outside courtrooms are affected.").
93 See, e.g., Ruby Dhand, Creating a Cultural Analysis Tool for the Implementation of Ontario's
Civil Mental Health Laws, 45 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 25, 35 (2016) (recommending further that
"cultural and other intersectional factors [be probed] during the hearing processes."). On how culture
can shape the entire risk assessment process "from instrument construction and validation, to risk
marker sensitivity, symptom articulation, and client-clinician interaction," see Stephanie M.
Shepherd & Roberto Lewis-Fernandez, Forensic Risk Assessment and Cultural Diversity:
Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 427, 427 (2016)
(discussing implications of the decision of Ewert v. Canada, [2015] FC 1093 (Fed. Ct.), allowing an
action against Correctional Services of Canada for an unjustified violation of the plaintiff's claims of
right to life, liberty, and security of the person under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.).
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commitment hearing. These include facial expression; frankness;
suspiciousness; anger; speech volume; clarity; and coherence. 94
Above and beyond these issues, it is further necessary to consider the reality
that ethnic minorities report and demonstrate significantly lower levels of
interracial/ethnic trust than do non-Hispanic whites. 95 Consider this in the
context of the brief doctor-patient interviews that regularly precede civil
commitment.96
We know that clinicians are frequently unaware of patient cultural views
around preferred illness labels, perceived illness causes, hesitancy to take
medications, side effects, and preferences for treatments.97 By way of example,
we minimize the "importance of cultural mistrust as a psychological construct in
the lives of African Americans."9 ' Ethnic minorities who are "unconvinced that
clinicians understand their cultural views have seven times higher odds than
Whites of ending treatment." 99
In this context, it is vital to also consider the role of the expert witness. The
cultural differences that complicate clinical interactions are likely to play a role
in forensic evaluations as well. "As some researchers have pointed out,
transference and countertransference may be accentuated in forensic evaluations
of subjects from an ethnic minority group."10 This important issue is rarely, if
ever, considered by courts.ioi
III. A CONSIDERATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
It is necessary to also consider the impact of race and gender in matters
related to institutionalization once a trial court orders commitment. We believe it
is impossible to uncouple the data and the findings about these issues from what
we have previously discussed with regards to the commitment process.
9 Josepha Campinha-Bacote, Cultural Considerations in Forensic Psychiatry: The Issue of Forced
Medication 50 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 3 (forthcoming 2017).
9 Javier Boyas & Tanya Sharpe, Racial and Ethnic Determinant ofinterracial and Ethnic Trust, 20
J. HUM. BEHAV. Soc. ENV'T. 618, 618 (2010); see also Chanita Hughes Halbert et al., Racial
Differences in Trust in Health Care Providers, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 896, 898 (2006).
96 JAMES A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE AND INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT 32 (1993).
9 See generally Campinha-Bacote, supra note 94 (discussing cultural views as implicated in medical
treatment).
9' See Arthur J. Whaley, Cultural Mistrust: An Important Psychological Construct br Diagnosis and
Treatment ofAfrican Americans, 32 PROF'L PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 555, 555 (2001).
99 Neil Aggarwal et al., The Development of the DSM-5 Cultural Formulation Interview-Fidelity
Instrument (CFI-FI): A Pilot Study, 25 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 1397, 1398 (2014).
.oo Hicks, supra note 48, at 28 (citing Silva JA, Leong GB, Weinstock R., Cultural & Ethnic
Minorities, in PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 479-84 (Rosner R. New York
1994)).
'' Certainly, in our (aggregate) two decades-plus of representation of this population in individual
and class actions, it was never considered a single time.
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First, we introduce a brief background. An individual who is involuntarily
committed to an institutional setting has certain rights under the U.S.
Constitution. 102 These rights include the right to a reasonably safe environment,
the right to be free from unreasonable restraint, and the right to minimally
adequate treatment or training necessary to realize the rights to safety and
freedom from restraint.'03 In addition, a fourth right urged by Justice Blackmun
in his concurring opinion, the right not to deteriorate in an institutional
setting, 104 has been adopted by many states. 10s Whether or not there is a
constitutional violation is determined by what is now known as the "professional
judgment" standard: whether "the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment."'
Nothing in this law mentions or considers issues of race or of culture. But
the history of institutional mental disability law cannot be uncoupled from these
issues. In 1969, a federal district court in Alabama concluded that "[racial]
segregation and discrimination in the operation of Alabama's mental health
system clearly violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause.""0 7 This case was decided
only three years before the case of Wyatt v. Stickney,'0o the landmark Alabama
case, the first right-to-treatment class action,1 09 that was characterized by one of
the co-authors (MLP) as "the most important institutional rights case litigated in
the history of domestic mental disability law." 0
Turn next to questions of gender in the context of Youngberg's
constitutional requirement of a "safe environment." Women have sued hospitals
in many cases on both constitutional and state tort grounds because of rape and
sexual assault in institutional settings."' For instance, a court has found that a
facility director may be constitutionally liable for failure to protect a teenage
102 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
03 Id. at 315-19.
104 Id. at 327.
105 PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, § 7-5.1, at 7-111- to 7-118 (discussing cases adopting Justice
Blackmun's formulation).
106 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
107 Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291, 298 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
1os Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
109 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the
Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 L. &
PSYCHoL. REV. 121 (2011) (discussing the historical importance of the Wyatt litigation).
"o Id. at 121.
.. See generally Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1987); Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d
779 (8th Cir. 2006).
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patient who engaged in a sexual relationship with a staff member.1 12 Courts have
allowed assaulted patients to recover when the incidence of sexual assault is
clear and rampant."' Too often, though, the doctrine of qualified immunity, the
doctrine that protects state officials, has barred the recovery of women who
claim sexual assault while involuntarily confined." 4
Compounding the legal barriers to recovery are entrenched opinions on
women regarding promiscuity and consent. An involuntarily committed
pregnant woman was prevented from recovering on her claim that she was raped
during observation because the court found insufficient evidence of past rapes at
the facility.' '5 Because the state raised qualified immunity, the plaintiff needed
to show that the federal "rights" allegedly violated were "clearly established." 6
Although the court noted that the state was aware of sexual activity within the
facility, the woman could not prevail without demonstrated evidence of other,
prior incidents of rape."' The court distinguished Youngberg because, "unlike
[here], the patient in Youngberg had been injured on many occasions, both by
his own violence and by the reactions of other patients to him.""' The court
reasoned that Youngberg did not apply because "[n]o evidence exists of previous
sexual assault or other serious battery upon [the patient] or any other patient (by
another patient or by a member of the staff)."ll9 The court stressed that since her
doctors "[n]ever had reason to believe that she was at risk of assault,"'2 0 and that
"[she] made no complaints about any male patient in the admissions unit,"' 2 ' the
"case is simply too unlike the pattern of sixty to seventy injuries shown in
112 Ammons v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1032-34 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2379 (2012).
"3 Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying qualified immunity for failure to
supervise a staff person who repeatedly sexually assaulted patients).
114 Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 886-87, 892 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that qualified immunity
protected state officials in a lawsuit by an involuntarily committed raped woman who was the only
woman in a ward full of men); Davis, 835 F.2d at 1177 (involving a claim brought by mental patient
who had sex with a staff member and gave birth to a child); Elizabeth M. v. Ross, No. 8:02CV585,
2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 45107, at *4, *7-8, *29 (D. Neb. May 11, 2005) (certifying a class of women
subject to rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and physical assault at three
state institutions), vacated by Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 785-88 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding a lack of typicality in that some women alleged being raped and sexually assaulted by staff
and others by other patients, that most of the women were from one institution, and that most had
already been discharged).
"' Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 311-12 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the director
and officer were entitled to qualified immunity because at the time ofpatient's alleged rape, it was
not clearly unconstitutional for mental institutions to fail to supervise patients for fifteen minutes,
and there was no history of rape for the past twelve years).
"Id. at 310.
i" Id. at 311.
11s Id.
" Id.
20 Id. at 312.
2' Horsley, 39 F.3d at 312.
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Youngberg for that case to have settled the applicable law in these circumstances
for the purposes of qualified immunity." "122 Remarkably, and, to our view,
incomprehensibly, it would appear that underlying the court's legal reasoning, is
the conventional opinion that a sexual encounter that stands alone, is considered
consensual without other additional examples or proof of rape.123
Aside from the gender implications of Youngberg v. Romeo, the case also
focused on the right to be free from "unreasonable restraint."' 24 A number of
studies have shown that minorities are restrained and secluded more often and
longer than whites. 25 The perception that African-Americans and Hispanics, are
"more hostile, aggressive, and potentially dangerous" 126 contributes to the
unequal treatment. "In other instances, researchers indicated that different rates
of seclusion and/or restraint could have been due to differences in diagnoses
when racial groups were compared."1 27
Past studies have recognized the significance of admission status as an
important independent predictor of both seclusion and restraint.1 28 Specifically,
voluntary patients or those whose commitment was mandated by the courts,
were less likely to undergo seclusion or restraint than those who were admitted
to the hospital on an emergency basis. 129 Several other studies have shown that
involuntarily hospitalized patients were significantly more likely to undergo
seclusion or restraint, but there has been a lack of verifiable research to conclude
the overall significance of admission status in the area of seclusion and
restraint. 130 If in fact, researchers conducted studies to further solidify this
connection, we would no doubt see a continued disproportionate number of
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-21 (1982).
125 See, e.g., Gregory M. Smith et al., Pennsylvania State Hospital System's Restraint Reduction
Program, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1115 (2005) (discussing how minorities are more likely to be
secluded for longer period of time than whites); Joseph A. Flaherty & Robert Meagher, Measuring
Racial Bias in Inpatient Treatment, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 679 (1980) (discussing the increased
use of restraints and seclusion for African American patients, as opposed to white patients).
126 Tracy Benford Price et al., The Use of Restraint and Seclusion in Different Racial Groups in an
Inpatient Forensic Setting, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 163, 163 (2004).
127 Id. at 166.
121 See Paul H. Soloff & Samuel M. Turner, Patterns of Seclusion: A Prospective Study, 169 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 37 (1981).
129 Abigail Donovan et al., Two-Year Trends in the Use of Seclusion and Restraint Among
Psychiatrically Hospitalized Youths, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 987, 989 (2003).
130 Id.; see also Armando Barragdn, Jr., Seclusion and Mechanical Restraints Among Ethnic
Minorities: Understudied and Needed Area of Research, I MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 99
(2012).
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minorities in seclusion and restraint given the frequency that minorities are
brought in through the criminal justice system."'
We turn our attention next to the question of involuntary medication over
objection. There is, at the least, a qualified right to refuse medication that can be
overridden only in cases in which the patient poses an immediate danger to self
or others or is incompetent to make the decision in question.' 32 This body of law
results from the widespread findings of permanent (often life-threatening) side-
effects from the first generation of antipsychotic medications."'
Here, some important disparities jump out at us. As discussed previously,
African-American patients appear to have their conditions more "commonly
misdiagnosed, to be administered higher doses of antipsychotic medication, not
to receive proper antidepressant or other psychotropic treatment, and to have
higher rates of tardive dyskinesia . . .."34Importantly, in cases of individuals
with psychiatric disorders who are substance abusers, "racial and ethnic
disparities exist in the availability of [psychiatric] medications." 3 5
Gender issues, although equally troubling, are somewhat different in focus
and stem from issues related to sexual autonomy. 136 The valid and reliable
evidence is unanimous: women clearly feel less able to talk-significantly less
able, when compared to male patients-to their healthcare providers about the
sexual side effects of prescribed psychotropic medications. Juxtapose this with
evidence that almost three times as many male patients than female patients felt
justified in stopping medication because of effect on sexual function.' 37
On the question of cultural competency, the lack of cultural competence of
forensic psychiatrists can negatively affect decisions regarding forced
medication- especially if the patient in question is from an ethnically or
"' Melissa Thompson & Kimberly Barsamian Kahn, Mental Health, Race, and Police Contact:
Intersections ofRisk and Trust in the Police, 39 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT.
807 (2016).
132 See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), stay denied in part, granted in part,
481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified & remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated &
remanded en banc, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982).
' See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, § 8-2, at 8-4 to 8-16.
134 Hicks, supra note 48, at 28, (citing, inter alia, William M. Glazer et al., Race and Tardive
Dyskinesia Among Outpatients at a CMHC, 45 PSYCHIATRIC SERS. 38 (1994)). See also Stephen
Strakowski et al., Racial Influence on Diagnosis in Psychotic Mania, 39 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS
157 (1996) (discussing the over-diagnosis and over-medication of African-Americans wrongly
diagnosed with schizophrenia).
"s Hannah K. Knudsen et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in SSRI Availability in Substance Abuse
Treatment, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 55, 55 (2007).
1 See generally PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 72.
137 Kenneth Paul Rosenberg et al., A Survey of Sexual Side Effects Among Severely Mentally Ill
Patients Taking Psychotropic Medications: Impact on Compliance, 29 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY
289, 289 (2003).
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racially diverse cultural group. 138 It should go without saying that cultural
assessment of every patient is vital in any decision involving pharmacology. 139
This is confounded by findings that there is virtually no research available on
the relationship between cultural competency and evidence-based medicine
practices at all. 140
We are limiting ourselves to considerations of matters related to
commitment and institutionalization. This limitation, though, should in no way
be interpreted to suggest that, in matters related to psychiatric
institutionalization, the law disproportionately mistreats women and minorities
in solely these cases. If one expands one's vision to issues involving any
relevant aspect of criminal procedure-e.g., the incompetency status, the use of
the insanity defense, sentencing, forensic evaluations, the special issues involved
in juvenile cases-one finds deadeningly similar parallels.141
IV. FouR FACTORS
Our careers in mental disability law-as practitioners, academics, and
scholars-have made it crystalline-clear to us that it is impossible to understand
this area of the law without a full consideration of the malignant and corrosive
impact of sanism, pretextuality, heuristic reasoning and (false) "ordinary
common sense."
42 These factors have "poisoned and corrupted" all of mental
disability law, 143 and have "malignantly distort[ed] both the legislative and
judicial processes."4' In the following sub-sections, we discuss each of these
factors.
A. Sanism
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other
irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) racism, sexism,
138 Campinha-Bacote, supra note 94.
"I Cora Mufioz & Cheryl Hilgenberg, Ethnopharmacology: Understanding How Ethnicity Can
Affct Drug Response Is Essential to Providing Culturally Competent Care, 105 AM. J. NURSING 40,
40 (2005); Josepha Campinha-Bacote, Becoming Culturally Competent in Ethnic
Psychopharmacology, 45 J. PSYCHOSOCIAL NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 27 (2007).
.40 See Rob Whitley, Cultural Competence, Evidence-Based Medicine, and Evidence-Based
Practices, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1588, 1588 (2007).
1 The authors will be exploring these issues in a subsequent article.
142 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense,
and the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 (2003)
(referencing Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common
Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990)).
14 See Perlin, supra note 142, at 17. See Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might
Have Drugs at Your Command": Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial
Detainees from the Perspectives of International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALBANY
Gov'T L. REV. 381, 395 (2015).
1' See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Simplify You, Classify You: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in
Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 607 (2009).
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homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 145 Sanism "infects both our jurisprudence and
our lawyering practices" and is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable,
"based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization,"l4 6 sustained and perpetuated by use of alleged "ordinary
common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in unconscious response to
events both in everyday life and in the legal process.1 47
B. Pretextuality
Pretextuality describes the ways in which courts accept testimonial
dishonesty-especially by expert witnesses-and engage similarly in dishonest
(and frequently meretricious) decision-making. 141 It is especially poisonous
where courts accept witness testimony that shows a "high propensity to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." 149
It is impossible to understand any aspect of mental disability law without
understanding how these two concepts and factors totally dominate all
jurisprudential developments (and do so invisibly). These factors affect all
participants in the judicial system, including: 1) Lawyers; 2) Jurors; 3) Judges;
4) Administrators; 6) Witnesses; and 7) Scholars. 15 0
C Heuristics
Heuristics refers to a cognitive psychology construct that describes the
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-
processing tasks, the use of which frequently leads to distorted and
systematically erroneous decisions, and causes decision-makers to ignore or
misuse items of rationally useful information.'5 "One single vivid, memorable
14 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47, 49 (1993). The
classic study is GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); see generally ELIZABETH
YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICE (1996) (discussing forms of prejudice); see
generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21-35
(2000) (discussing roots of sanism).
146 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain ": Considering
the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REV. 481, 486 (2008).
'o See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On Sanism, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 373 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, There's No Success like Failure/ and Failure 's No Success at All:
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
49 See, e.g., Perlin, Half Wracked Prejudice, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting Michael L. Perlin, Morality
and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and
Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)).
150 As to all categories, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks":
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 684 (2003).
... See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "They're Planting Stories in the Press": The
Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 212
(2013).
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case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational
choices should be made."1 52 Empirical studies reveal jurors' susceptibility to the
use of these devices. 153 Similarly, legal scholars are notoriously slow to
understand the way that the use of these devices affects the way individuals
think.154 The use of heuristics "allows us to willfully blind ourselves to the 'gray
areas' of human behavior," 5 5 and predispose "people to beliefs that accord with,
or are heavily influenced by, their prior experiences."15 6
D. False "Ordinary Common Sense"
Finally, in this context, we must consider the meretricious allure of a false
"ordinary common sense" (OCS) that has long pervaded our jurisprudence in
this area-a "self-referential and non-reflective" way of constructing the world
"('I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way,
therefore that's the way it is')."'5 It is supported by our reliance on a series of
heuristics-cognitive-simplifying devices that distort our abilities to rationally
consider information. 1
E. The Keys to Future Progress
Sanism, pretextuality, heuristics, and ordinary common sense must continue
to be acknowledged and dismantled. They infect our daily lives and contribute
to the further marginalization of women and racial minorities in institutional
mental health law.1 59 The unquestioning acceptance of certain "common sense"
52 See Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me ": The Insanity Defense,
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375,
1417 (1997) (discussing David Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy 19 STAN.
LAW. 10, 13 (1984)).
" Jonathan Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through
the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990).
15 Thomas Tomlinson, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1461, 1461-62 (1995).
..s See Perlin, supra note 142.
56 See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 151, at 213 (quoting Russell Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural
Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (2009)).
1 See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. &
CIVIL RTS. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012).
5 Perlin, supra note 152, at 622.
15 On the relationship between race and pretextuality in the judicial process, see Perlin, supra note
144, at 622-23. On the relationship between heuristic thinking and our attitudes towards racial
minorities who had previously been hospitalized, see Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 139
(1991). On race and sanism, see Sonia Meerai, Idil Abdillahi & Jennifer Poole, An Introduction to
Anti-Black Sanism, 5 INTERSECTIONALITIES: GLOBAL J. SOC'L WORK ANALYSIS, RES., POLITY, &
PRAc. 18 (2016). On gender and sanism, see Jemma Tosh & Krista Carson, A Desire to be
'Normal'? A Discursive and Intersectional Analysis of 'Penetration Disorder,' 5
INTERSECTIONALITIES: GLOBAL J. SOC'L WORK ANALYSIS, RES., POLITY, & PRAC. 151 (2016). See
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beliefs that are inherent within each of the four factors is the ultimate barrier that
we have enacted against the protection and provision of equal rights for
vulnerable populations. To sustain and perpetuate our stereotypes, we use
sanism, ordinary common sense, and other cognitive-simplifying devices such
as heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life
and in the legal process.I" Each of these "hidden" concepts pollute our thought
processes, which are deeply influenced by our understanding and perception of
culture.i' Reflective thought about cultural conditions needs to be unburdened
by ordinary common sense and sanism-especially in the area of
institutionalization-and is the first step in the creation of better legal and
medical protections of marginalized populations. In many ways, true change
must begin with the courts and judicial acknowledgment of pretextual
tendencies. Although pragmatism emphasizes reliance on judges' inherent
faculties of common sense and good judgment, it does not call for judges to use
the tools of other disciplines more pertinent to its methods to become expertly
analytical of themselves.162 One of those disciplines must necessarily be the
incorporation of therapeutic jurisprudence.
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE' 63
Therapeutic jurisprudence' 64 "look[s] at law as it actually impacts people's
lives"' 65 and assesses law's influence on "emotional life and psychological well-
generally Perlin, supra note 131, at 393-97 (citing, inter alia, SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND
PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985)). See also, e.g., Christian
Breheny et al., Gender Matters in the Insanity Defense, 31 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 93 (2007) (reporting
on valid and reliable research confirming the role of sanism in insanity defense attitudes).
i6o Perlin, supra note 147, at 373, 374.
161 John D. Brewer, Competing Understandings of Common Sense Understanding: A Brief Comment
on "Common Sense Racism, " 35 BRIT. J. SOC. 66, 70 (1984) ("Common sense knowledge ... is a
personal construction. ... It is constructed on the basis of each member's personal biography of past
experiences and socially transmitted 'recipes' and categories.").
62 Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 494,
507 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)) (practical
reason theorists have turned their attention to justifying methods of judicial decision making).
163 This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 12; Perlin &
Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 12; and Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You
Have No Choice"': Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision About Mental Health
Treatment Even iflt Is Not What S/He Would Have Chosen,- CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J.
-(2017) (in press). Further, it distills the work of one of the co-authors (MLP) over the past two
decades, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).
'6 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (1990); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 20, § 2-6,
at 2-43 to 2-66. Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental
Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992).
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being." 166 Therapeutic jurisprudence mandates that "law should value
psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic
consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served
by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."l67
The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal
rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their
therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. 1" From
therapeutic jurisprudence, we gain "a new and distinctive perspective utilizing
socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications."16 Therapeutic
jurisprudence is ". . . a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a
movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . .
. [emphasizing] psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 170 It
thus supports an ethic of care.' 7 '
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and
voluntariness,1 72 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must
have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a
165 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
166 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and Strategies,
in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Dennis P. Stolle
et al. eds., 2000).
167 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
'" Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got ": The
Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735,
751 (2005).
169 Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008). It is also part of a growing
comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal
ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. Susan Daicoff, Afterword:
The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 166, at 465.
170 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to
Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick &
David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education:
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006).
"'See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 170, at 605-07; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party
Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra
note 170. The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
172 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the
importance of "voice," see also Freckelton, supra note 169, at 588.
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decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's
story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice
and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in
which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive.
Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they
voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the
end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their
own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved
behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when
they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their
own decisions.1 73
The question we must confront is this: do our practices related to the
commitment process and institutional treatment of racial minorities, women and
those from other cultures comport with the "3V's" seen by Professor Ronner as
the sine qua nons of therapeutic jurisprudence? We believe the answer is, sadly,
"absolutely not."
In another article, Professor Ronner discusses the Supreme Court's decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 174 holding that a lower court had erred in
holding that an employer may escape liability for a Title VII sex discrimination
violation "if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.""' She notes: "The
Price Waterhouse decision is not just about fair play in the workplace. With its
debunking of gender stereotypes and censure of the 'intolerable and
impermissible catch 22,' 176 Price Waterhouse effectively fosters the 'three Vs'
of therapeutic jurisprudence."-1 7 Similarly, in an article discussing "rape myths,"
Professor Christian Diesen calls on therapeutic jurisprudence as an interpretive
tool: "Another therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the issue is promoting
education, in schools and other social circuits, about rape myths and gender
inequality-the reluctance of reporting seems to be proportional to a society's
acceptance of the rape myth."t 7
173 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002) (internal citations
omitted). See generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(2010) (globally discussing these principles in a therapeutic jurisprudence context).
174 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
17 Id. at 237.
76 Amy D. Ronner, Let's Get the "Trans" and "Sex" Out oflt and Free Us All, 16 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 859, 867 (2013) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
177 Id. at 867-68.
`7 Christian Diesen, The Importance ofReporting Rape, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 933, 961 (2013).
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Our practices related to the commitment and institutionalization of women
and racial minorities fly in the face of what therapeutic jurisprudence counsels.
It mocks the "ethic of care" 179 that is central to the heart of therapeutic
jurisprudence, and turns its back on therapeutic jurisprudence's mandate of
"psychological health."so The very act of discrimination-either intentional or
unintentional-is anti-therapeutic and against the goals of cultural sensitivity.
Discrimination in any form should be banned from our treatment centers and
courtrooms; however, in order to achieve that end, we must recognize inherent
and ingrained misconceptions and faulty beliefs. By incorporating therapeutic
jurisprudence into our practices, we can utilize diverse perspectives and tools to
erase the marks of cultural insensitivity. Therapeutic jurisprudence's ultimate
goal, in this area specifically, is to recognize the flaws in our perceptions and
practices in order to create a better approach to achieving guaranteed rights and
liberties for all persons.
Some twenty years ago, one of the authors (MLP)- with another law
professor and a practitioner- writing about institutional mental health law,
concluded that "therapeutic jurisprudence may indeed offer a path to redemption
for a constitutionally based mental disability law jurisprudence." 81 The authors
of this article believe that is still so, and especially more so in any analysis that
focuses on the issues of race and gender that are at the heart of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some of our most vulnerable populations-racial, cultural, and gender
minorities- are consistently harmed by marginalization that targets persons
with mental illness. If we continue to ignore the pervasive stereotypes and false
"ordinary common sense" ingrained within this area (both in the legal system
and society at large), we will continue to impede necessary advances in care,
treatment and legal protections for this cohort of individuals. Our hope is that
this article inspires lawyers, practitioners, and researchers to take seriously the
deleterious impact of cultural insensitivity on all areas of the mental health
assessment, treatment and litigation processes.
The toxicity of racism and sexism is intensified in the context of sanism.
Our practices of civil commitment and institutionalization are poisoned even
more when we fold in the ways that we stereotype and typify racial minorities,
women, and those from the non-dominant culture. 182 Society continues to
"9 See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 170, at 605-07.
18 Winick, supra note 167, at 26.
"I Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to
Redemption?, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 119 (1995), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 166, at 739.
82 See Perlin, Ha-lf Wracked Prejudice, supra note 9, at 28 ("[Mlental disability law is premised on
stereotype and prejudice, on typification and on fear.").
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marginalize and dehumanize such individuals,' and does so often in invisible
ways.'1 4 And this marginalization is often most pernicious in the context of
cases involving racial, cultural and gender minorities. It is time that we heed
Judge David "Bazelon's admonition that we need to be vigilant about not
'overgeneraliz[ing] about citizens whom it is easy to overgeneralize about." 8 5
We believe that, through the conscious adoption of therapeutic
jurisprudence principles, there is a chance that there may be some light at the
end of a very dark tunnel. Current practices-based on statistically invalid and
socially pernicious stereotypes of "dangerousness" in matters involving African-
Americans or of women-make a mockery of the "validation" principle that is
at the heart of therapeutic jurisprudence. Certainly, these practices fly in the face
of promoting the "psychological health" that TJ efforts demand and, again,
flaunt the 'ethic of care"' 6 that is a sine qua non of TJ.
Again, in Chimes of Freedom (the source of the initial part of the title of
this article), "Dylan dangles the notion that humanity has yet to grasp the
promise of liberty floating just out of reach."' Liberty does "float ... out of
reach" of the individuals about whom we are writing today. Our hope is that,
finally, this will change.
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